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 Introduction 
 The welfare-enhancing role of spillovers from foreign direct investment (FDI) in 
a host country generates significant interests and debates among policymakers, 
long after a wide range of regulatory changes in favour of FDI in the late 1980s 
and the 1990s. The expectation of positive spillovers reinforces the devel-
opment of government policies to attracts multinational enterprises (MNEs) 
to the host country. However, as is documented in surveys of the literature on 
FDI spillovers (Görg and Strobl, 2001; Havránek and Irsová, 2012; Meyer and 
Sinani, 2009; Wooster and Diebel, 2010), the empirical evidence on FDI spillo-
vers is rather mixed. The surveys highlight two important factors that might 
offer the explanations of mixed findings. First, the degree of foreign ownership 
is a primary factor in determining the strength of linkages between domestic 
and foreign firms and thereby affects spillovers (Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2008). 
As argued by Görg and Greenaway (2004), MNEs may be effective at preventing 
spillover effects of firm-specific assets. This is connected to the ownership strat-
egies of MNEs that often use wholly owned subsidiaries (WOS) to better control 
the technologies they transfer to their foreign locations. Second, absorptive 
capacity of domestic firms and the strength of linkages between domestic and 
foreign firms are critical for spillovers. However, studies taking these factors 
into consideration are sparse. According to Havránek and Irsová (2012), among 
1205 horizontal spillover estimates from 52 studies, only 5.7 per cent and 7.8 
per cent control for absorptive capacity of domestic firms. 
 Three generic foreign ownership modes are possible. Besides WOS, firms can 
also use majority foreign-owned joint ventures (MAJVs) or minority foreign-
owned joint ventures (MIJVs). A few studies that consider foreign ownership 
mode to be an important factor in influencing spillovers (e.g. Abraham, Konings 
and Slootmaekers, 2010; Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2008) argue that spillo-
vers from foreign-owned joint ventures (JVs) may be higher than those from 
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WOS because the network connections of domestic partners in JVs to other 
domestic firms provide effective mechanisms for the diffusion of technologies 
from foreign-owned affiliates (FOAs) to domestic firms. In the case of WOS, the 
control of knowledge-based assets (KBAs) limits spillover effects (Javorcik and 
Spatareanu, 2008). The connection between ownership mode and spillovers is, 
however, more complicated than is implied by this view. Although the ability 
of domestic firms to gain access to the MNEs’ pools of knowledge is likely to be 
better in the case of JVs, the pool of knowledge available for spillovers is possibly 
more conducive in WOS than in JVs. The greater degree of control afforded by 
WOS is likely to induce MNEs to transfer more and higher quality technologies, 
thereby creating a larger potential for spillovers. Leakages from knowledge pools 
are likely to be greater in JVs, but the size and quality of the pools is perhaps 
greater in WOS. Moreover, there may be differences between MAJVs and MIJVs. 
The linkages that domestic partners in JVs have to other domestic firms may be 
stronger in MIJVs than in MAJVs (Ramachandran, 1993) because the domestic 
partner in a MIJV often has frequent and deeper interactions with domestic 
agents (domestic competitors, suppliers etc.). As a result, the potential for diffu-
sion of knowledge externalities from MIJVs may be higher. On the other hand, 
MAJVs may be more likely to receive newer and more advanced technologies 
than MIJVs are, providing better knowledge pools that permit access to a higher 
quantity and quality of KBAs than is the case for MIJVs. Existing studies con-
sider either MAJVs vs. MIJVs (Dimelis and Louri, 2004) or WOS vs. JVs without 
clearly distinguishing between MAJVs and MIJVs (Abraham et al., 2010; Javorcik 
and Spatareanu, 2008). This study includes all three generic ownership modes 
and uses a better definition of foreign-ownership mode than existing studies 
used. The improvement in definition in this study (following Ayyagari, Dau and 
Spencer, 2009 and Sarkar, 2010) is that the share of foreign ownership is by ref-
erence to the dominant shareholder with voting rights. This is an appropriate 
definition of foreign ownership because promoters (those with voting rights) 
such as firms or corporate groups possess significant control and decision-
making authority, whereas non-promoters (those without voting rights) such as 
foreign institutional investors, venture capital funds, banks, mutual funds and 
insurance companies do not exercise direct control (Chalapati and Dhar, 2011). 
This study uses a more comprehensive method of identifying foreign-ownership 
mode than the existing literature and thereby improves the prospects of cap-
turing how these modes affect spillovers. 
 In addition to the knowledge pool of FOAs and their linkages to domestic firms, 
the role of absorptive capacity is also considered to be of importance in the existing 
studies (e.g. Barrios and Strobl, 2002; Damijan, Knell, Majcen and Rojec, 2003; 
Girma, 2005; Griffith, Redding and Reenen, 2003; Haskel, Pereira and Slaughter, 
2007; Kokko, 1996; Liu and Buck, 2007; Zhang, Li, Li and Zhou, 2010) Absorptive 
capacity refers to the ability of an organisation to identify, assimilate and exploit 
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knowledge from the environment (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989). It is contended 
that firms must have an adequate level of absorptive capacity to benefit from FDI 
spillover effects. However, the empirical findings are mixed. In many of these 
studies, absorptive capacity is proxied by the technology gap between the foreign 
and the domestic firms, R&D intensities of domestic firms or human capital 
embodied in domestic firms. The strength of such approaches lies in the focus on 
technological ability or resources required for knowledge absorption. However, 
whether such measures are effective in capturing absorptive capacity is debatable. 
Haskel et al. (2007), Girma (2005), Zhang et al. (2010) and Damijan, Rojec, Majcen 
and Knell (2013) use an alternative approach to control for absorptive capacity 
by splitting the sample in terms of firm size, and they find smaller firms or plants 
with a low share of skilled workers in the workforce lack the necessary absorptive 
capacity to benefit from FDI. Studies using samples of large firms are therefore 
more likely to capture domestic firms that have absorptive capacity capable of 
benefiting from spillovers. 
 This chapter examines the effects of foreign ownership modes on spillovers 
and, by use of a sample of large domestic firms, takes account of the absorptive 
capacity factor. A conceptual model explores the possible implications for 
knowledge pools, linkages with domestic firms and the level of competitions 
associated with different foreign ownership modes. A sample of large firms of 
the Indian manufacturing industry provides the data to test for the relationship 
between foreign ownership modes and spillovers. The chapter is organised as 
follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature on FDI spillovers in terms of 
foreign ownership modes, which leads to the development of a conceptual 
model. Section 3 describes data and research methodology. It is followed by 
section 4, which discusses how the findings relate to the research propositions 
along with the theoretical and policy implications of the results. Section 5 
provides a conclusion. 
 FDI spillovers: theoretical review and context-setting 
 International business theory suggests that MNEs must possess firm-specific 
advantages (FSAs) in the form of new or advanced technologies and/or marketing 
and management know-how to overcome ‘ liability of foreignness ’ (Dunning and 
Lundan, 2008). Such FSAs, particularly in the form of KBAs, imply that there 
is potential for spillovers because of the public goods nature of non-proprie-
tary knowledge and/or market failures of some form in protecting proprietary 
knowledge. These FSAs not only exert competitive pressures on domestic firms 
but also enhance the existing knowledge pool of the host country and thereby 
increase the potential for spillovers to domestic firms in the host country. In 
this process, the net impact of competitive pressure and unintended knowledge 
transfer by FOAs to domestic firms defines spillovers. 
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 The primary channels of FDI intra-industry spillovers are demonstration, labour 
mobility and competition effects (Blomström and Kokko, 1998). Demonstration 
effects in the same industry occur when domestic firms imitate product and 
process technologies possessed by FOAs through ‘reverse engineering’. Akin to 
this ‘ reverse engineering ’, the domestic firms may also benefit from the presence 
of FOAs through imitation of managerial and organisational innovation (Ben 
Hamida and Gugler, 2009). Labour mobility effects arise when skilled employees 
that are trained in FOAs move away from their employers to commence with 
entrepreneurial ventures or work for other local employers (Lipsey and Sjöholm, 
2004). The entry of MNEs into an industry could also generate ‘ fresh winds of 
competition ’. However the net impact could be ambiguous. On one hand, the 
entry of MNEs may force domestic firms to reduce X-inefficiencies or to upgrade 
their technological capabilities to remain competitive; as a result, there is an 
improvement in productivity of the latter (Görg and Greenaway, 2004). On 
the other hand, the entry of MNEs increases competition in output and input 
markets. Competition in output market may reduce a domestic firm’s market 
share, forcing them to produce less output and thereby pushing up their average 
costs (Aitken and Harrison, 1999). Competition in input market such as labour 
markets may lead to an increase in wages and better employee compensation 
(Driffield and Taylor, 2000). This is likely to be unfavourable to domestic firms 
and can have a negative effect on their productivity. 
 Foreign ownership modes and FDI spillovers 
 The conventional argument is that spillovers from JVs are higher than those 
from WOS (Abraham et al., 2010; Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2008). This is because 
the network connections of domestic partners in JVs to other domestic firms 
provide an effective mechanism for diffusion of technology and know-how 
from FOAs to domestic firms, whereas WOS are used by MNEs to maintain 
control of their KBAs and prevent leakage of know-how (Desai, Foley and Hines, 
2004; Ramachandran, 1993), which limits spillovers from WOS. However the 
link between foreign ownership modes and FDI spillovers is more complicated 
and will be considered in more depth below. 
 The empirical evidence on spillovers from foreign ownership modes is scant 
and the findings are mixed. Dimelis and Louri (2004) detect no significant effect 
from MAJVs in Greece but find positive effects for ‘ small ’ Greek firms from the 
presence of MIJVs. Blomström and Sjöholm (1999) reveal insignificant intra-
industry spillovers from both JVs and WOS in Indonesia, whereas Javorcik and 
Spatareanu (2008) show negative spillovers for both JVs and WOS. In the case 
of China, Abraham et al. (2010) find evidence of positive spillover effects for 
JVs and negative effects from WOS, whereas in another study on China, Tian 
(2010) reports positive spillovers from both equity and non-equity JVs and no 
significant effects from WOS. The inconclusive empirical findings again point 
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out the need for a conceptual model to elucidate the possible effects of foreign 
ownership modes on FDI spillovers. This requires consideration of the char-
acteristics of knowledge pools, the strength of linkages and the competition 
effects associated with foreign ownership modes. 
 Knowledge pools and FDI spillovers 
 The transfer of KBAs enhances knowledge pools in FOAs, which enable them to 
offset ‘liability of foreignness’ when competing in a host country (Dunning and 
Lundan, 2008). Since WOS enable better internalisation of KBAs and provide 
greater control over these assets than JVs (Buckley and Casson, 1976), MNEs 
are likely to transfer technologies of newer vintage through WOS and older 
technologies through JV (Mansfield and Romeo, 1980). MNEs may also commit 
more resources to transfer KBAs to WOS (Blomström and Sjöholm, 1999) and 
thus increase the quality, volume and speed of technology transfer in WOS 
compared to JVs (Mansfield and Romeo, 1980). Moreover, the source of techno-
logical know-how in WOS that is available, albeit imperfectly (because of the 
low level of localisation), for domestic firms to access and to learn from is more 
potent (Tortoriello and Krackhardt, 2010). 
 While WOS receive newer and sophisticated technologies than do MAJVs 
(Ramachandran, 1993), MAJVs receive more mature technologies than MIJVs 
(Almeida and Fernandes, 2008; Desai et al., 2004). A JV between a foreign and 
domestic firm induces threats regarding appropriability of know-how. This 
threat is higher in the case of MIJVs where the domestic partner has a dominant 
role. As a result, the capacity and motivation to transfer KBAs is lower in MIJVs. 
In summary, the volume and quality of transfer of KBAs, and thereby the size of 
knowledge pools, increase with the degree of foreign ownership in FOAs – that 
is, pools are smaller in MIJVs, intermediate in MAJVs and larger in WOS. 
 Linkages and FDI spillovers 
 The linkages or network connections of FOAs with other domestic firms in an 
industry can also affect the extent of FDI spillovers. Although knowledge pools 
play a vital role, the extent of their ‘ diffusion ’ or ‘ leakage ’ is likely to occur when 
these linkages/network connections are deep enough to permit knowledge 
diffusion. Linkages are likely to affect FDI spillovers in two ways. First, they 
provide opportunities for domestic firms to catch up technologically (Meyer 
and Sinani, 2009) by allowing for richer interactions that are crucial to transfer 
and absorption of know-how (Kotabe, Martin and Domoto, 2003). Second, they 
act as information flow conduits that channel non-redundant information 
benefits to host-country firms – for example, learning about new best practices 
and techniques (McEvilly and Zaheer, 1999; Podolny, 2001). 
 The extent of spillovers through linkages is likely to be stronger when FOAs 
have a higher degree of local embeddedness as this will permit closer and richer 
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interactions between FOAs and domestic firms. WOS have weaker linkages than 
JVs as their degree of local embeddedness is low, and they also tend to protect 
their KBAs by minimising threats to the appropriability of know-how. Thus, the 
opportunities for spillovers from WOS through linkages is likely to be marginal, 
whereas JVs tend to facilitate spillovers as they are more embedded in the host-
country market (Belderbos, Capannelli and Fukao, 2001; Chen, Chen and Ku, 
2004; Eberhardt, McLaren, Millington and Wilkinson, 2004; Wei, Liu, Wang 
and Wang, 2012) and can quickly respond to local conditions (Inkpen, 2000; 
Zhou and Li, 2008). This is of particular importance for the transfer of tacit 
knowledge such as management know-how (Inkpen, 2000; Kogut and Zander, 
1993). Within JVs, MIJVs have domestic partners with a more dominant role, 
and therefore, their linkages to other domestic firms in MIJVs are likely to be 
stronger, relative to MAJVs. For example, as Javorcik and Spatareanu (2008) 
point out, in an MIJV, the domestic partner can be in charge of hiring policies 
and place local staff in key technical or managerial positions without taking 
actions to limit employee turnover. To summarise, the effects of linkages or 
network connections on spillovers should be highest in MIJVs, followed by 
MAJVs and (lowest in) WOS. 
 Competition effects and FDI spillovers 
 Chen (1996) introduces two firm-specific and theory-based constructs – market 
commonality and resource similarity. Market commonality refers to ‘the degree 
of presence that a competitor manifests in the markets it overlaps with the focal 
firm’, and resource similarity is ‘the extent to which a given competitor possesses 
strategic endowments comparable, in terms of both type and amount, to those of 
the focal firm’. Chen (1996) posits that the severity of competition co-determines 
the degree of commonality and resource similarity. A JV with stronger linkages 
is likely to facilitate knowledge diffusion and exploit compatible resource/assets 
between partners (Inkpen, 2000; Kogut and Zander, 1993) than is a WOS. Thus, 
a JV is likely to tap into the sourcing networks of its domestic partners, leading 
to high-level resource similarity with other domestic firms (e.g. Belderbos et al., 
2001; Eberhardt et al., 2004; Wei et al., 2012). 
 In terms of market commonality, JVs are more likely to exert stronger com-
petitive pressure on domestic firms than WOS, as JVs tend to have greater 
degree of embeddedness in the industry and are more familiar with local 
markets. This effect is more likely to be dominant in a MIJV than a MAJV as 
the domestic partner of the MIJV has greater control because of its dominant 
equity share – thus providing better knowledge of domestic markets, which 
enables the MIJV to engage with and monitor competition more efficiently 
(Chen and Chen, 2005). Within WOS, greenfield WOS are keen on launching 
standardised product lines belonging to their corporate parents to better exploit 
FSAs (Rugman, Verbeke and Nguyen, 2011). This might augment the extent of 
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‘ liability of foreignness ’ in WOS, thereby thwarting their efforts to compete for 
higher sales compared to JVs. WOS established through acquisition are more 
likely to have higher level local embeddedness than greenfield WOS and could 
embark on the transfer of KBAs more suited to local conditions, which might 
stimulate greater degree of industry competition. That said, in terms of market 
similarity, the competition effect resulted from the presence of WOS is likely to 
be severe and could be a similar level to that from the presence of JVs if acquisi-
tions account for a majority of WOS in a host country 1 . 
 In the context of FDI spillovers, industry competition is likely to display both 
positive and negative effects (Blomström and Kokko, 1998). Positive effects 
emerge when domestic firms are able to adjust input costs  vis-a-vis their output 
and respond effectively to growing market share of FOAs, the failure of which 
leads to the loss of market share, the reduction in profit and ultimately the exit 
from the market. In line with the discussion above, it is postulated that MIJVs 
display higher competition effects, followed by MAJVs and then by WOS, 
subject to the mix of greenfield or acquisition WOS. 
 The arguments outlined above provide the basis for a conceptual framework on 
potential spillovers under different foreign ownership modes (see Table 13.1). 
 Data and methodology 
 Data sources 
 The main data source is the Prowess database of the Centre for Monitoring 
Indian Economy (CMIE). This database provides information on domestic firms 
and FOAs of MNEs listed on India’s Stock Exchanges. It includes large firms that 
account for 75 per cent of all corporate taxes, more than 95 per cent of excise 
duty and 60 per cent of all savings of the Indian corporate sector (Marin and 
Sasidharan, 2010), thus enabling the investigation of spillovers from large FOAs 
to large domestic firms. Large firms, on average, are better at adopting man-
agerial best practices, including the introduction of new production techniques 
and the management of human capital, to improve firm productivity (Bloom 
and Van Reenen, 2007). As a result, knowledge pools of FOAs and absorptive 
capabilities of domestic firms are likely to be better captured in the case of large 
firms. Thus, investigation of FDI spillovers with a focus on large firms could 
 Table 13.1  Postulated effects on foreign ownership modes of key 
factors affecting spillovers 
 Ownership Modes  MIJV  MAJV  WOS 
 Knowledge Pool Low Intermediate High
 Linkages High Intermediate Low
 Competition High Intermediate Low
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be considered as the most plausible scenario. The Prowess database is exten-
sively used, and there is a large number of firm-level published studies using 
this database (e.g. Balakrishan, Pushpangadan and Babu, 2000; Kathuria, 2002; 
Kumar and Aggarwal, 2005; Marin and Sasidharan, 2010; Topalova, 2004). 
 National Industrial Classification (NIC) 2008 code for the manufacturing 
sector is used in this study to categorise industrial groupings. The definition 
of foreign ownership is foreign equity is equal to or is greater than 10 per cent 
of the total equity. To supplement missing information in Prowess on the 
level of foreign ownership, company websites and annual company reports 
are used. Furthermore, the adjustment of nominal data for sales, assets and 
expenditures are deflated using the gross domestic product (GDP) deflator and 
the wholesale price index obtained from the Reserve Bank of India. 
 In the data cleaning and inputting process, firms that did not report or that 
provided insufficient information on key economic activities are excluded. The 
final dataset contains 1,624 firms with 5,203 observations covering the period 
of 1991–2008, of which 1,398 firms are domestic firms and 226 are FOAs. The 
number of FOAs in our sample is in line with other studies using Prowess – 
for example, Marin and Sasidharan (2010) include 273 FOAs in their sample. 
Similar studies on the manufacturing sector in Argentina by Chudnovsky, López 
and Rossi (2008) and Marin and Bell (2006) have 145 and 283 FOAs, respect-
ively, in their samples. 
 Model estimation 
 The assessment of FDI productivity spillover effects – that is, productivity growth 
of domestic firms caused by FDI presence – requires estimates of the total factor 
productivity (TFP) of firms. Problems arise if firms adjust their inputs according 
to their expectations about economic conditions, leading to the possibility that 
idiosyncratic shocks in productivity are captured in the error term (Griliches 
and Mairesse, 1995). The Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) approach, henceforth 
the LP method, is commonly used to overcome this potential problem (Javorcik 
and Spatareanu, 2008; Liu, Wei and Wang, 2009). The LP method is easier to 
implement than the alternative approach by Olley and Pakes (1996) because 
there is no requirement for information on firm entry and exit and no infor-
mation loss that might result from negative values in the proxy investment 
variable. Very few firms exited the dataset, which provides another reason to use 
the LP method. The LP method of estimating TFP for two-digit level industry 
production functions provides the data for the dependent variable. 
 The control variables include competitive characteristics of industries 
(industry concentration and import penetration ratios (IMP)) and key condi-
tions in domestic firms that affect absorptive capacity (R&D intensity (RD) and 
firm scale (SCALE)). Industry concentration is measured with Herfindahl index 
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(HHI). The RD and SCALE variables are proxies for the firms’ own innovation 
effort and scale effect, respectively. 
 The baseline model is:
 lnTFP ijst = α 0 + α 1 FORFP jt−1 + α 2 HHI jt−1 + α 3 IMP jt−1 + α 4 RD ijst−1 
 + α 5 SCALE ijst−1 + μ ijst (1) 
 lnTFP ijst is the logarithm of the TFP of domestic firm i in industry j, in state s, at 
time t. Following Wei and Liu (2006) to maximise the detection of spillovers, three 
different measures are used to capture FDI spillover effects (FORFP) – the share 
of MNEs’ employee compensation in the three-digit industry (employment); the 
share of total sales by MNEs in the three-digit industry (total sales) and the share 
of MNEs fixed assets in the three-digit industry (fixed assets). The study meas-
ures spillovers from WOS, MAJVs and MIJVs in the same way as FDI spillovers, 
by changing the shares of all MNEs to the shares of WOS, MAJVs and MIJVs in 
the three-digit industry, respectively. The measurement of foreign ownership 
modes in this study updates Javorcik and Spatareanu (2008) by using foreign 
ownership levels of promoters’ equity share rather than both promoters’ and 
non-promoters’ equity share. This definition allows for the determination of 
the degree of direct control over KBAs that are likely to be exercised by foreign 
parents. A majority of the existing studies have failed to address this issue 
and therefore are likely to elicit biases on the extent of control of KBAs in FDI 
spillover. This leads to the following model:
 lnTFP ijst = α 0 + α 1 WOSFP jt−1 + α 2 MAJVFP jt−1 + α 3 MIJVFP jt−1 + α 4 HHI jt−1 
 + α 5 IMP jt−1 + α 6 RD ijst−1 + α 7 SCALE ijst−1 +μ ijst (2) 
 The introduction of a one-year lag deals with the potential problem that spillo-
vers will not raise instantaneously. Moreover, this lag structure allows for the 
control of simultaneity bias arising from the fact that MNEs may be attracted to 
productive industries (Aitken and Harrison, 1999). The appendix provides infor-
mation on the definition and measurement of the variables used in the study. 
 Equations (1) and (2) are estimated with corrections for heteroskedasticity 
and for clustering at the industry-year level to account for correlations between 
firm observations within the same industry-year (Wooldridge, 2002). The cor-
relation between foreign presence and productivity enhancement in firms may 
connect to other factors, which can be assumed to be fixed, such as firm, time, 
industry and region-specific factors. These factors could be connected to things 
such as organisational and industry culture, technology opportunities, external 
policy shocks and infrastructure conditions. To control for these fixed effects, 
use is made of year, industry and region dummies in a fixed effects panel data 
model. An alternative method to the fixed effects model is first differencing. 
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Following Aitken and Harrison (1999), Javorcik (2004) and Haskel et al. (2007), 
the first-differencing model is estimated, which involves the loss of 225 firms 
from the sample but generates more robust results than the fixed effects 
model. This is because estimating first differences removes unobserved time-
invariant industry and region-specific effects (assuming that the time-varying 
disturbances in the original equations are not serially correlated) and thereby 
produces estimates that are no longer biased by any omitted variables that are 
constant over time (Bond, Hoeffler and Temple, 2001). As argued by Javorcik 
(2004), ‘the examination of longer differences gives relatively more weight to 
more persistent changes in the variables of interest and hence reduces the influ-
ences of noise’. This approach is consistent with previous studies on FDI spillo-
vers, and thus, the discussion involves the use of first differencing. 
 Another econometric issue is selection bias, which may occur due to firm entry 
and exit but may simply reflect some firms choosing not to report. To address 
this issue, we maintain the use of original unbalanced panel, as suggested by 
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). The final econometric issue is the multicolline-
arity between explanatory variables. We checked both the correlation matrix 
and variance inflationary factors and found this is not a concern. For brevity, 
the test results are not reported but are available upon request. 
 Results and discussions 
 TFP estimation results 
 Table 13.2 presents a summary of TFP in terms of industry and ownership mode. 
It is clear that FOAs do not always have higher productivity than domestic firms 
have. In sectors 11 (beverage production), 13, 14, 15 (textile, wearing apparel, 
leather and related products), 19 (coke and refined petroleum products), 22 
(rubber and plastic products) and 26 (computer electronic and optical prod-
ucts), the average TFP of domestic firms are higher than that of FOAs. This 
trend is prominent in the case of highly concentrated industries and indus-
tries employing low-income and unskilled workers (Chari and Gupta, 2008). 
A possible explanation is that domestic firms in these industries face weak 
labour regulations domestically and are therefore in a position to extract higher 
returns from employees, although the price of labour is the same for FOAs. The 
FOAs in these industries encounter effective monitoring of labour regulations 
and therefore are unable to utilise similar strategies. 
 FDI spillovers estimation results 
 Table 13.3 reports the results for FDI spillovers. Columns 1–3 present the results 
without reference to foreign ownership modes and columns 4–6 show evidence 
with reference to foreign ownership modes. Columns 1–3 reveal that there are 
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significant and positive spillover effects on domestic firms’ TFP when total sales 
and fixed assets measures are used. Columns 4–6 reveal the identification of 
both negative and positive spillovers when using a comprehensive definition 
of foreign ownership modes that includes WOS, MAJVs and MIJVs. WOS have 
positive spillovers with total sales and fixed assets measures, and MAJVs have 
positive spillover effects in all three measures. The findings of positive spillo-
vers from MAJVs are consistent with Abraham et al. (2010) and Tian (2010). 
However, in contrast to findings of negative effects from WOS in Javorcik and 
Spatareanu (2008) and Abraham et al. (2010), this study finds that WOS are also 
 Table 13.2  TFP estimation results 
Sl. No. Sector No. of obs.
Domestic 
firms (TFP) WOS (TFP)
MAJV 
(TFP) MIJV (TFP)
 1 Food processing 1452 38.744 43.432 52.744 41.325
 2 Beverage production 174 0.027 0.005 0.004
 3 Textiles, wearing 
apparel, leather and 
related products
148 0.174 0.108
 4 Wood and wood + 
cork products, fur-
niture, paper and 
paper products
26 3.803 4.844
 5 Coke and refined 
petroleum products
212 1.473 1.118 0.795 1.293
 6 Chemicals and 
chemical products
2677 8.449 11.496 12.934 6.237
 7 Pharmaceutical, 
medicinal and 
botanical products
1531 9.987 22.679 15.166 7.924
 8 Rubber and plastic 
products
1325 3.829 2.584 2.268 3.590
 9 Non-metallic mineral 
products
46 0.068 0.110 0.114
10 Basic metals, fabricated 
metal products except 
machinery and 
equipment
134 1.007 1.432 0.822 1.593
11 Computer electronic 
and optical products
415 12.566 6.348 4.719 4.281
12 Electrical equipment 585 4.231 4.309 4.951 9.653
13 Machinery and 
equipment n.e.c.
705 0.709 0.505 0.790 0.533
14 Motor vehicles trailers 
and semi-trailers, other 
transport equipment
40 3.928 5.599 5.235
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associated with positive spillover effects. Finally, MIJVs display negative and 
significant effects for employment and fixed assets measures. This contradicts 
previous studies, such as by Dimelis and Louri (2004), which reveal positive 
and significant spillovers for MIJVs. The results for MAJVs are perhaps more 
robust because positive associations were identified for all measures of spillo-
vers, whereas WOS and MIJVs are picked up by two of the measures. 
 The results for control variables reveal that industry competition effects 
(Herfindahl index and import penetration) are consistent across all specifica-
tions, with the former having insignificant effects and latter being positive and 
significant. R&D intensity has a positive effect on TFP, whereas the impact of 
SCALE is negative across all specifications. 
 Discussion 
 The findings reported in this chapter add to the literature that suggests that 
models of spillovers need further development to enable better identification 
of spillovers (Crespo and Fontoura, 2007; Marin and Sasidharan, 2010). This 
 Table 13.3  Foreign ownership modes and FDI spillovers 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 FDI Spillover 
 Variable 
Measurement Employment
Total 
sales
Fixed 
assets Employment
Total 
sales
Fixed 
assets
FORFP  0.038 
 [0.059] 
 0.158** 
 [0.063] 
 0.154** 
 [0.066] 
WOS 0.028  0.167**  0.322*** 
[0.077]  [0.065]  [0.096] 
MAJV  0.136**  0.249***  0.232*** 
 [0.065]  [0.083]  [0.085] 
MIJV − 0.424*** − 0.355*** −0.119
 [0.156]  [0.120] [0.115]
HHI 0.027 0.013 0.019 0.022 −0.001 −0.014
[0.073] [0.072] [0.073] [0.074] [0.074] [0.076]
IMP  0.231**  0.229**  0.240**  0.205**  0.246**  0.234** 
 [0.102]  [0.101]  [0.101]  [0.096]  [0.102]  [0.096] 
RD  0.116***  0.112***  0.130***  0.115***  0.115***  0.137*** 
 [0.042]  [0.040]  [0.042] [0.043] [0.042] [0.041]
SCALE  − 0.014* 
 [0.07] 
 − 0.012* 
 [0.07] 
 − 0.013* 
 [0.07] 
 − 0.012* 
 [0.07] 
 −0.011 
 [0.07] 
 − 0.012* 
 [0.07] 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3652 3652 3652 3652 3652 3652
R 2 0.281 0.281 0.282 0.283 0.282 0.284
 Note : 1. Dependent variable is the logged TFP calculated using Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) procedure; 2. 
Robust standard errors clustered by industry-year in brackets; 3. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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study finds that spillovers are contingent on foreign ownership modes of 
MNEs. Positive intra-industry spillovers exist for large Indian firms from WOS 
and MAJVs, but negative effects arise from MIJVs. The results suggest that 
accounting for foreign ownership modes, based on a fuller and appropriate 
classification (promoters rather than non-promoters equity share), enables a 
more detailed identification of spillovers than seems to be the case in studies 
that do not account for this factor in deciding on foreign ownership mode. 
 The results indicate that MAJVs have robust spillover effects on domestic 
firms compared to WOS. This could be because MAJVs are characterised by 
well-developed linkages and fairly large and high-quality knowledge pools. It 
is likely that WOS have larger and better quality knowledge pools than MAJVs, 
but they perhaps have lower linkages to domestic firms. Moreover, moderate 
competition arising from the presence of MAJVs also incentivises domestic 
firms to better adapt to competition and improve their productivity. The results 
of the positive spillover effects for WOS in Indian industries imply that the 
large knowledge pools offset the lower level of linkages. The higher level of 
competition, when compared to MAJVs, that’s generated by WOS also favours 
domestic spillovers from these types of JVs. 
 The capture of spillovers from WOS through only two measures may 
arise from differences in protection of intellectual property and in compe-
tition, as compared with MAJVs. It is possible that WOS use better protection 
mechanisms to defend their KBAs in Indian manufacturing sectors, thereby 
preventing leakage from knowledge pools. In India, due to weak protection 
of intellectual property, WOS may be associated with the transfer of inferior 
(non-proprietary) technologies, and therefore, the quality of knowledge pools 
might be low. On the other hand, the avoidance of MIJVs as a foreign own-
ership mode may be best because the competition effects from MIJVs are likely 
to dominate any positive spillover effects (Chen, Kokko and Tingvall, 2011). 
While the competition effects arise from rivalry between MIJVs and domestic 
firms for market share, the spillover effect arises from the presence of know-
ledge pools and linkages with domestic firms (Chang and Xu, 2008). MIJVs 
are characterised by low-level knowledge pools but significantly well-devel-
oped linkages and a higher degree of competition effect on domestic firms. As 
a result, negative competition effects from MIJVs are likely to outweigh the 
positive effects that are likely to arise from good linkages with domestic firms 
and knowledge pools (Merlevede, Schoors and Spatareanu, 2010). Another 
way of interpreting this is that the high competition effects and the presence 
of strong linkages in MIJVs are not enough to offset the likelihood of lower 
knowledge pools in MIJVs, relative to WOS and MAJVs. In essence, the find-
ings provide support for some of the key arguments developed in the con-
ceptual model. 
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 Conclusion 
 Governments in developing countries, including India, often favour JVs over 
WOS, believing that the active participation of domestic firms will bring greater 
benefits to other domestic firms. The findings of this study provide partial 
support for this. Policymakers, however, also need to understand that restrictions 
on foreign ownership could prevent accumulation of larger and deeper know-
ledge pools associated with technology transfer in WOS. Spillovers from these 
knowledge pools are likely to result in higher benefits to domestic firms when 
compared to JVs. Our findings reveal that the overall outcomes for knowledge 
spillovers may depend on whether there is high knowledge transfer potential 
in WOS, which may outweigh the lower transfer of KBAs but better network 
linkages in JVs. In the case of India, MIJVs appear to have the lowest prospects 
of spillovers. This may mean that the strong network linkages to domestic firms 
by the national partner in FOAs do not, in most cases, overcome the disadvan-
tages of the lower knowledge transfers that MIJVs receive. For MAJVs, however, 
it is possible that these network linkages compensate or indeed outweigh the 
benefits of higher knowledge transfers in WOS. The findings undermine con-
ventional wisdom in Indian FDI policy targeted at restricting foreign ownership 
to JVs in certain industries in order to protect domestic firms from adverse com-
petition. This policy may, however, reduce the quality of technology transfer 
that is possible in the case of WOS. 
 The interpretation of the results requires caution. First, our findings draw 
on a specific spectrum of the Indian economy – that is, large listed firms in 
the manufacturing sector. Therefore, any generalisation from this in terms of 
both sector and firm selection needs care. Second, although the study took 
measures to mitigate the endogeneity issue, a more effective solution involves 
using datasets that cover a longer period and contain information on effective 
instrumental variables. Third, the results may be affected by specific charac-
teristics of the Indian business environment arising from the nature of insti-
tutional systems leading to particular business and organisational cultures, 
extensive protection of some industries, low levels of technological dynamism 
and weak enforcement of some regulations. Fourth, the conceptual model is 
based the arguments that both knowledge transfer potential and linkages of 
FOAs are important for spillovers, and competition effects generated by FOAs 
influence the extent to which domestic firms will learn and enhance product-
ivity. Unfortunately the data needed to test for the presence and weight of the 
above qualitative factors for spillovers is unavailable. Therefore, it is not pos-
sible to identify the relative importance of these factors. 
 Despite these limitations, we believe our findings could help discussions on 
how to improve FDI and related policies in order to enable higher spillovers to 
domestic firms. Policies to encourage domestic firms to effectively interact with 
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WOS might enhance the prospects of positive spillovers from the deep know-
ledge pools that such FOAs are likely to develop in host locations. 
 Appendix: variable definition and measurment 
 Ownership mode is determined using the following classifications:
 Wholly owned subsidiaries (WOS): firms whose foreign promoters’ equity • 
share is 100 per cent in the Prowess database and who are defined as a wholly 
owned subsidiary by the firm’s website and secondary sources. 
 Majority foreign-owned joint ventures (MAJVs): firms whose foreign • 
promoters’ equity share ranges from 51 per cent to 99 per cent in the Prowess 
database. 
 Minority foreign-owned joint ventures (MIJVs): firms whose foreign promoters’ • 
equity share ranges from 10 per cent to 50 per cent in the Prowess database. 
 Information regarding foreign ownership modes is from the equity share 
datasheet provided by Prowess. However, in the case of some WOS, secondary 
sources such as websites and company reports are used to complement equity-
share information from Prowess database. In cases where the information about 
a firm is not available in Prowess (whether it is WOS or not) and is also not veri-
fiable from the corporate websites of firms, other secondary sources were used 
to determine the classification of the firm. Assam Carbon Products, for example, 
is a foreign firm but has no equity-share information available in the Prowess 
Variable Definition and measurement
LTFP log(TFP)
HHI The sum of squared firm shares of sales in a three-digit industry
IMP The ratio of imports to domestic demand in a three-digit industry
RDINT The ratio of domestic firm’s R&D expenses to sales
SCALE The ratio of domestic firm’s sales to average three-digit industry-level sales
FORFP Foreign spillover variable proxied by the share of FOAs in a three-digit 
industry total or in a three-digit industry within a region, excluding the 
focal firm
WOSFP WOS spillover variable proxied by the share of wholly foreign-owned sub-
sidiary in a three-digit industry total or in a three-digit industry within a 
region, excluding the focal firm
MAJVFP MAJV spillover variable proxied by the share of MAJVs in a three-digit 
industry total or in a three-digit industry within a region, excluding the 
focal firm
MIJVFP MIJV spillover variable proxied by the share of MIJVs in a three-digit 
industry total or in a three-digit industry within a region, excluding the 
focal firm
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dataset. It has a website, but it does not report shareholding information. The 
only information provided is that Morgan Crucible Co. (UK) has a stake in the 
firm. To validate this information, use was made of government websites such 
as Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI, accessible at  http://www.sebi.
gov.in/ ) to provide information on foreign equity. The data gathered from this 
web site was further supplemented by another reputable website  http://www.
securities.com to check the information found on the SEBI website. 
 Note 
 1 .  This applies to the knowledge pools, linkages and resource similarity arguments as 
well but to a lesser extent. 
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